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Negative demand shocks have afflicted many American cities in the 20
th century and are
the main explanation for their decaying housing markets. But what is the role of housing
supply?  Rational entrepreneurs should not invest in new buildings and renovation when
home values are below replacement cost. Households with an investment motive should
behave similarly. Empirically, we find that construction costs are not very sensitive to
building activity but do vary with local income, unionization rates in the construction
sector, the level of local regulation, and region.  We also document that the variance in
building costs generates substantial variance in renovation expenditures across cities.
Owner-occupied homes with market values below replacement costs spend about 50
percent less on renovation than similar homes with market values above construction
costs.  We also report on the distribution of the ratio of house value-to-construction cost
across markets.  The distribution is relatively flat in a number of declining cities,
especially older manufacturing areas.  In these places, a relatively modest 10 percent
decline in replacement costs would find between 7-15 percent of the local housing stock
moving from being valued below cost to above cost. Even though modest declines in
construction costs are unlikely to change basic urban trends, our results suggest they can
be an important factor in determining whether various neighborhoods in declining cities
will experience any significant reinvestment. In this respect, declining cities truly cannot
afford to be expensive cities in terms of replacement costs: urban scholars and policy
makers should begin to pay more attention to the cost side of cities.
JEL: R12, R31
Keywords: construction costs, city decline, renovation, unions2
1. Introduction
The decline of once urban powerhouses such as Detroit, Buffalo, Cleveland, and
Philadelphia is an outstanding feature of the evolution of American cities in the latter half
of the 20
th century.  And, the American story is not unique, as the shift of manufacturing
employment away from urban areas also foreboded decline for European cities such as
Glasgow, Liverpool, Rotterdam, and Turin.
Negative demand shocks for metropolitan areas inevitably impact their local housing
markets.  While it is clear that home prices will be lower, there is no such certainty about
what will happen to the number of people in the city or about how much reinvestment in
their homes those people will undertake.  Economists’ fundamental guide to
understanding the distribution of people and firms across places, the Rosen-Roback
compensating differential model,
1 shows that negative demand shocks could result in low
enough prices that there would be no population loss whatsoever.  Recent results from
Glaeser and Gyourko (2001) suggest that the short-run supply of housing is almost
completely inelastic in declining cities and that, if housing prices are low enough, people
will stay.
However, depreciation ultimately erodes the housing stock, and reinvestment is
required to avoid decay over the long run.  The reason it is not clear that reinvestment in
the housing stock will fall (conditional on population) is that such investment in declining
markets is not driven by low values per se but by whether values are low relative to
replacement costs. Rational entrepreneurs should not invest in new buildings or
renovation of existing ones when home values are below replacement or construction
                                                          
1 See Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982).3
costs.  Owner-occupiers with an investment motive should behave similarly.
2 However, if
replacement costs are low enough, the present value of reinvestment can be positive even
with low or declining home values.
That said, the fact is that we often do see decay in the housing markets of
declining areas.  In this paper, we ask whether this process is exclusively demand driven
or whether the supply side of the housing market plays a meaningful role.  Glaeser and
Gyourko’s (2002) findings that housing prices are close to replacement costs in most
areas, with values below replacement costs in a number of declining cities highlights the
potential empirical relevance of construction costs in investment and reinvestment
decisions within and across cities.  For houses in specific neighborhoods that are priced
near construction costs, modest differences in replacement costs may be critical on the
margin to determining whether fundamental decay sets in or reinvestment occurs in the
face of a negative shock.
This leads us to begin our analysis with a careful look at construction costs, which
need not be exogenous to the decay process.  As already suggested, if they are flexible
downward in response to negative demand shocks, then there need not even be a negative
impact on housing investment.  However, our analysis finds that construction costs are
not very sensitive to construction levels. There is substantial between-city variation in
costs that cannot be accounted for with a standard, upward-sloping supply schedule.
The key supply shifters that do explain the variance in costs are regional location,
unionization rates in the construction sector, local income, and local government
                                                          
2 Given the primacy of investment motives in this story, we would expect the largest effects to be found
among absentee landlords of rental housing.  Owner-occupiers obviously may reinvest for non-financial
reasons because they consume the service flow of their unit.  While data availability requires us to focus on4
spending on regulation and code enforcement (which we use as a proxy for the overall
strictness of regulatory enforcement).  Controlling for other factors, construction costs are
from 10-14 percent lower in metropolitan areas within the South and Midwest regions,
compared to those in the Northeast and West.  Controlling for region, income, and
construction activity, a one-standard-deviation increase in the unionization rate is
associated with a 9 percent higher level of construction costs.  A one-standard-deviation
increase in the log of per capita metropolitan area income is associated with just over a 2
percent increase in construction costs.  The standardized marginal effect of additional
local spending on regulation and code enforcement also increases construction costs by
about 2 percent.
After accounting for the variance in construction costs, we proceed to answer the
main question of the paper--by how much does investment and reinvestment in existing
homes change when construction costs change?  Our measure of “investment and
reinvestment” includes all expenditures on renovation, maintenance, alterations, and
additions as reported in the various files of the American Housing Survey.  Throughout
the remainder of the paper, we refer to the aggregate of these expenditures as
“renovation” spending for simplicity.
3
Two effects are estimated:  (a) an own-price effect that reflects the average change in
renovation spending across all units from a change in construction costs;  and (b) the
impact on renovation spending associated with home values changing from being above
construction costs to below construction costs.  We find the demand for renovation
                                                                                                                                                                            
owner-occupiers, the impacts we find for them are likely to reflect the lower bound of the effects for rental
landlords.
3 This is purely for ease of exposition, and one should keep in mind that this term encompasses all spending
from routine maintenance to adding a bathroom.5
services to be relatively price-inelastic, with our best estimate being –0.28 (i.e., a 10
percent higher level of construction costs is associated with 2.8 percent lower level of
renovation spending).  Using instrumental variables techniques to account for the
endogeneity of home values to these expenditures and for measurement error, we find a
very substantial impact of an owner’s home value changing from being above to below
construction cost. This effect is on the order of 50 percent of mean renovation spending,
or about $900 on an annual basis.
The size of this effect suggests that differences in construction costs are likely to be
economically relevant in determining the extent of revitalization versus decay in areas
where many homes have values close to replacement costs.  In the final section of the
paper, we document that there is substantial heterogeneity in the distribution of home
values across different market areas.  In places with high house values, such as San
Francisco, San Diego, Los Angeles, and New York, a 10 percent drop in construction
costs would not change the fraction of homes with values above replacement costs. Land
prices are so high in these areas that there are virtually no homes valued at less than 110
percent of construction costs.
In a host of other areas, many in relative or absolute decline, a 10 percent change in
construction costs is associated with from 7-15 percent of the owner-occupied stock in
the central city changing status from being below replacement cost to above cost.  It is in
places with relatively flat distributions of prices-to-construction costs that declines in
construction costs have the greatest potential to generate substantial reinvestment in the
local housing stock.  These areas, which include many older and Rust Belt cities ranging
from Philadelphia to Milwaukee, are in decline, but their values have not fallen so far that6
modest drops in construction costs cannot lead many houses to have values in excess of
costs.
In other declining cities such as Detroit, the impact is much smaller and virtually
indistinguishable from that found in growing places such as Phoenix.  In both of these
areas, the change in costs does not change the fraction of units valued above costs.  Of
course, in Phoenix very few units are priced below cost anyway, while in Detroit the ratio
of value-to-cost is so far below one for most units that modestly lower construction costs
do not change the fundamental status of many homes.
While we certainly would not argue that modest declines in construction costs can
change basic urban trends, their level does appear to be an economically meaningful
factor in determining whether various parts of declining cities will experience any
significant reinvestment.  The moral to this story appears to be that declining cities truly
cannot afford to be expensive cities in terms of replacement costs.  For both urban
scholars and policymakers, much greater attention needs to be paid to the cost side of
declining cities in particular.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss
the potential importance of the supply side in the decline process. Section 3 describes the
various data sources we employ.  Section 4 empirically documents the determinants of
construction costs in a metropolitan area. This is followed in Section 5 with an analysis of
the relationship between construction costs and renovation expenditures.  Section 6 then
details how many homes in different markets are likely to have values close to
construction costs.  This density is key to determining where lower construction costs7
might have a large impact on housing reinvestment.  A brief summary concludes the
paper.
2. The Supply Side of City Decline
The potential impact of the supply side on decline can be examined within the
framework of a simple, traditional urban model.  To illustrate this, we begin by
considering the people who live in a given city. All consumers are identical, and each
person consumes one unit of housing. Individuals have well-defined preferences over
consumption (C ) and the quality of the housing location (Q) such that
(1)   , UU C Q  , with  12 0, 0 UU 
(2)   CYR Q 
(3)     , UU YR QQ  ,
4
where Y is income and   R Q is the rent corresponding to quality Q.  Spatial equilibrium
requires consumers to be indifferent between living in the city versus the rest of the
country. The utility level elsewhere is denoted by .  The spatial equilibrium then
defines the implicit bid-rent function,   ,, QY  so that equation (4) holds
(4)     ,, , UY Q Y Q    .
5
                                                          
4 This is more general than, and certainly inclusive of, the monocentric Alsonso-Muth-Mills model, where
quality takes the form of proximity to the CBD.  We do not follow that tradition strictly because we want to
avoid the counterfactual implication that decay always occurs in the suburbs.
5 Differentiating (4) with respect to Q:   '0
UU


















For simplicity, we assume that the only use for land is residential.  Further,
construction costs for a unit of housing are given by  . Depreciation takes the form that
the probability of the house falling down equals each period.  If we let  be the
discount rate, the value of redeveloping an empty lot at timet is given by
(5)    1 tt VQ Q V Q      .
where  1 t V   is the value of the home in the next period. At time t+1 the home will be
standing with probability 1   , and the owner will face the decision to redevelop again
with probability  . Thus,
(6)      2 (1 ) tt t VQ Q V V           .
It is easy to see that  12 tt VV   . Using this and equation (1) yields
(7)   2 tt VV Q     
Combining (2) and (3) we can derive
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The option to redevelop is thus valued as
(10) Max  
1
0, 1 (1 )
1
Q   


   
 	
.
Finally, the home price (   P Q ) capitalizes the future stream of rents from the
housing unit and incorporates the capitalized value of the redevelopment option. This is
given by the somewhat convoluted term,9
      22 2 2 (1 ) (1 ) ...
1( 1 ) 1
Q
PQ Q Q Q
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.  Thus, there is no reinvestment if
and only if    PQ   , or housing prices are below construction costs.
6
Figure 1 then illustrates how the relationship between P(Q) and  determines the size
of the city in equilibrium.  The maximum location quality is denoted as Q, and the
number of locations with quality Q is given by    Q  ,
7 with support  0,Q   
 .  The
minimum quality that will be developed/redeveloped is given by 
min Q such that
 
min PQ   or, equivalently,     
min 1 1( 1) Q   
   . The population in the city in




Qd Q     .  Our quality measure in Figure 1 reflects the
difference from the maximum quality level Q. Thus, higher qualities are closer to the
origin, with lower qualities (i.e., moving toward the right) corresponding to further
development of the city.
The supply side can influence the nature of decline in two ways.  One is by how it
affects the response to a negative demand shock.  As we show just below, this is
determined largely by whether construction costs themselves are an increasing function
of the level of building activity.  The second avenue of influence is more direct—namely,
                                                          
6 While it is clear that a rational entrepreneur will never redevelop units when prices are below construction
costs, it is not clear that owner-occupiers will behave similarly for a number of reasons.  First, they may
view expenditures on renovation as current consumption as opposed to being purely financially motivated
in our model.  In addition, the private valuation of a home may be above the current market price, which
corresponds to the valuation of the second highest bidder for the house.  Finally, construction costs may not
be the relevant prices for all types of renovation.  We address these issues more directly below in the
empirical work.10
by construction costs changing independently of demand.  The remainder of this section
models these demand and supply shocks within the context of our model.
A Negative Demand Shock
We now consider a negative demand shock in which income decreases in the city.
Recall that, in equilibrium, rents are a function not only of quality but of income and the
utility level elsewhere:      ,, , i UY Q Y Q    . Differentiating with respect to  i Y


















.  Thus, lower
rents exactly compensate city dwellers for the lower income.
We endogenize construction costs by assuming that they are a function of the
number of units being redeveloped at each point in time    N    , with    '0    .
With respect to redevelopment activity, the relevant condition at the fringe of the city is
given by
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Differentiating this with respect to Y yields
(12)    
min min
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7 In the case of the monocentric city,    Q  simply takes the value of the perimeter at each distance.11
When income decreases, the minimum developed quality goes up.  Redevelopers will
withdraw from “fringe” lower qualities, and these “fringe” areas will experience decline.
In fact these areas will disappear at an annual rate equal to the depreciation parameter  .
Note that decline is reduced if construction costs are sensitive to construction levels.
More specifically, if the supply of physical structures is completely elastic so that








. Thus, if construction costs fall when there are negative
demand shocks, that should reduce city decline.  Figure 2 illustrates this conclusion.  If
construction supply is very inelastic as given by the  '   schedule, the minimum quality in
the new equilibrium (
min
1 ' Q ) is higher, so that a bigger area of the city must have decayed.
However, if costs fall with the decline in demand (i.e., the  ’’ schedule is the relevant
one), then the extent of decay is reduced.  Thus, determining just how sensitive
construction costs are to decline is an important empirical question that needs to be
addressed.
A Negative Supply Shock
Changes in the supply side also could directly induce decay and shrink the city.  This
is illustrated in Figure 3 in which an upward shift in construction costs generates a
reduction in the area that is developed.  Just how important the impact of changes in
construction costs is on the long-run housing stock depends on the distribution of housing
location qualities    Q  . If the density of units with amenity levels at or near the fringe







Q    is big), small changes in construction costs may be
associated with substantial city decline. Thus, the distribution of housing prices near the12
“fringe” redevelopment quality (
min Q ) will be an important determinant of whether
changes in construction costs could have a meaningful impact on city decline.
This simple framework demonstrates that we need the answers to at least four
questions in order to better understand the role of the supply side in city decline.  First,
how responsive are construction costs to construction levels and decline?  Second, what
are the determinants of construction costs across cities?  Third, how do construction costs
influence the redevelopment/renovation of owner-occupied homes.  In particular, does
reinvestment decline when home values fall below replacement costs?   Finally, what is
the empirical distribution of units that are close to the redevelopment fringe?
3. Data
The American Housing Survey (AHS) is our primary data source on housing
prices and renovation expenditures. The metropolitan files of the AHS from 1983-1994
not only provide house price data but also contain information on investments and
reinvestments by owner-occupiers.
8  Data on 10 categories of expenditures are available.
9
We aggregate spending across all categories into a single sum that we term “renovation”
expenditures.
10  The Urban Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) less its shelter component is
used to convert all monetary values into 2001 dollars.  Average annual renovation
expenditures per household were $1,945 (with a standard deviation of $3,117) over the
                                                          
8 We are not able to use data from later surveys because of a change in the structure of the maintenance and
renovation questions.  After 1994, data are reported for very different categories of housing-related
expenses.  Hence, the 1983-1994 responses are not readily comparable to those from 1995-onward.
9 These are routine maintenance, roof repair or replacement, kitchen remodeling or addition, bathroom
remodeling or addition, siding replacement, storm windows or doors added or replaced, insulation added or
replaced, major equipment added or replaced, other major additions, and other repairs in excess of $500.
Reported spending in all categories except routine maintenance is for a two-year period.  Annual figures are
obtained by dividing by two.13
1983-94 period.  The distribution was skewed with a median of $793.  The interquartile
range was $152-$2,417, with 17 percent of the observations reporting zero renovation
spending.  Conditional on expenditures being greater than zero, the mean was $2,387.
We are able to match house price and renovation spending to construction cost
data for all 43 metropolitan areas in the 1983-94 metropolitan AHS samples.
11  Our
source for construction costs is the R.S. Means Company. Briefly, the Means Company
monitors construction costs in numerous American and Canadian markets.  We match the
markets to the corresponding MSA.
12 Local construction costs per square foot of living
area are reported.  Construction costs include material costs, labor costs, and equipment
costs for four different qualities of single-unit residences.  No land costs are included.
13
The Means data contain information on four qualities of homes—economy, average,
custom, and luxury.  The data are broken down further by the size of living area (ranging
from 600 sq. ft. to 3,200 sq. ft.), the number of stories in the unit, and a few other
differentiators, such as the presence of a basement.
14
                                                                                                                                                                            
10 We also worked with individual expenditure categories, but doing so yielded no key insights beyond
those found using the aggregate data.  See the discussion below and footnote 34 for those details.
11 See Appendix Table 1 for a list of these areas.
12 We recognize that construction costs can vary somewhat within a metropolitan area (for example,
between city and suburbs). However, our results are not sensitive to dividing the sample into units in the
central city versus suburban parts of the metropolitan areas.
13 Two publications are particularly relevant for greater detail on the underlying data:  Residential Cost
Data, 19
th annual edition (2000) and Square Foot Costs, 21
st annual edition (2000), both published by the
R.S. Means Company.
14 Somerville (1999) has critiqued the Means data, documenting that the evolution of a particular hedonic
estimate of construction costs for a sample of new buildings in Baltimore, Cincinnati, and Houston between
1979 and 1991 exhibits an evolution different from that of the Means data for those places. There is no
doubt that the data are imperfect.  However, they are available for a broad set of areas, and they have
passed an important market test in that they are widely used in the construction sector for budgeting
purposes.  Perhaps more relevant than the revealed preference of firms’ willingness to pay money for such
data is the fact that any measurement error in this series should have its usual effect—namely, to bias
toward zero the estimated relationship between construction costs and renovation spending.  Given the
absence of any reason to suspect the data would bias us toward finding a significant relationship, the issue
of quality literally is an empirical one.  And it turns out that the variable performs quite well empirically.
See below for more on that.14
The AHS and Means data are combined to create the ratio of price to construction
cost.  We focus on costs for a basic, economy-quality house with the average cost
associated with four possible types of siding and building frame. Generally, our choices
reflect low to modest construction costs.
15  We also use unit traits from the AHS to help
us identify the relevant costs for each unit (e.g., whether the proper costs are those
associated with there being a basement or not).
To obtain comparable values for homes “as if new,” we made a number of
adjustments to the AHS data prior to constructing this ratio.  While the data appendix
goes into the details, it is noteworthy that prices are adjusted to account for depreciation,
for general inflation, and for the fact that research shows owners overestimate the value
of their homes.
16
We also collected information on a variety of other variables, including housing
permits from the U. S. Bureau of the Census Series C-40 reports and per capita MSA-
level income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  Total local government
expenditures involved in regulating and inspecting private establishments for the
protection of the public or to prevent hazardous conditions (which include building code
enforcement) at the metropolitan level are obtained from the 1992 Census of
Governments. We always use 1999 MSA and NECMSA definitions when matching these
data to particular areas.
A final variable is the extent of unionization in the construction sector, which we
compute from various issues of the Current Population Survey.  Because there typically
                                                          
15 This strategy will tend to overstate the true ratio of price to cost for all but the lower quality homes.  The
implications of this are discussed more fully below.
16 The net effect of the adjustments on average is to increase prices above those reported.  Even after
deflating prices by 6 percent to account for overvaluation by owners (see Goodman and Ittner (1992)), the15
are too few usable observations by year and metropolitan area, we calculate unionization
rates in the construction sector by pooling all observations in the 1984-2000 CPS files by
metro area.  The results for the 47 metropolitan areas with populations of at least 1
million in 1992 are listed in Appendix Table 2.  There is a very wide range of
unionization rates in the construction sector, ranging from zero (San Antonio) to well
over 50 percent (Buffalo and Chicago).  In 14 of these areas, unionization rates are below
10 percent;
17  in another 20, they exceed 30 percent.
18
4. Construction Costs Across Metropolitan Areas
Data on construction costs per square foot and selected other variables were
successfully matched for a panel of 146 metropolitan areas.  In 1992, the year for which
we report on our analysis of the cross-sectional variation in construction costs, the
unweighted mean cost of physical construction of a small, economy-quality home was
$49.64 per square foot, with a standard deviation of $5.95.
19  The interquartile range runs
from $45.12/sq. ft. to $52.93/sq. ft.  Costs of a very modest quality home were lowest in
Columbus, Georgia, ($40.95/sq. ft.) and highest in Anchorage, Alaska ($69.34/sq. ft.).
20
                                                                                                                                                                            
mean adjusted value still is 32 percent higher than the unadjusted mean due to the importance of age and
vintage effects (which are described more fully in the Data Appendix).
17 From lowest to highest rates, they are San Antonio, Greensboro, Fort Lauderdale, Charlotte, Fort Worth,
Nashville-Davidson, Dallas, Orlando, Tampa, Atlanta, Salt Lake City, Phoenix, Houston, and Memphis.
18 Again in increasing order, they are Rochester (NY), Sacramento, Pittsburgh, Hartford, Portland (OR),
Boston, Newark, Philadelphia, Seattle, Indianapolis, San Francisco, Cleveland, St. Louis, New York City,
Milwaukee, Paterson, Detroit, Minneapolis, Buffalo, and Chicago.
19 All values are in 2001 dollars.  Information on other years is available upon request.  None of our key
findings is sensitive to the choice to report results for the year 1992.
20 Appendix Table 1 provides a more detailed look at construction costs for the smaller group of 43
metropolitan areas that can be matched to our metropolitan area panel from the AHS.  The reported prices
correspond to the year in which the MSA is first sampled and are in 2001 dollars.  The unweighted mean
cost for the Metro AHS sample was $56.31, with a standard deviation of $5.85. The interquartile range runs
from $52.08/sq. ft. to 60.32/sq. ft., with Norfolk, VA, having the lowest cost (46.29$/sq. ft.) and San
Francisco, CA, the  highest (72.88/sq. ft.).16
We begin our analysis by explaining the cross-sectional variance in construction
costs. We are especially interested in whether construction costs are sensitive to shifts in
demand.  Knowing the elasticity of the supply side of the market is critical for declining
areas as was illustrated in Figure 2. If construction costs fall in these areas, maintaining
existing structures or building new ones need not be so unattractive financially.
Table 1 provides the answer to this question in the form of regression results from a
specification in which the logarithm of construction costs for a 2,000-square-foot
economy-quality home in 1992 is the dependent variable.  The independent variables
include a proxy for the demand for structures in the area along with other control
variables. The log of total housing permits issued in the previous year serves as the proxy
for demand.
21  We also include the log of MSA per capita income, the share of
construction workers that are unionized in the MSA, local government expenditures on
regulation and inspection, and regional dummies.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are reported in the first column.
22  Note that
building costs are not very sensitive to the number of housing units built, suggesting that
the supply of structures is quite elastic.  However, the OLS specification suffers from a
classic identification problem—namely, in areas with higher construction costs, the
demand for new building is likely to be lower.  Hence, we perform an instrumental
variables (IV) estimation in which we use the log of population and the log of cooling
                                                          
21 Other obvious candidates are renovation and rehabilitation themselves.  However, they are strongly
correlated with the level of new housing construction.  Hence, using lagged permits avoids the endogeneity
associated with expenditures on renovation, which by construction are proportional to the price of
renovation.
22 Some MSAs only have a few usable CPS observations in the construction sector. Naturally, unionization
rates are estimated with more noise, the smaller the number of complete observations. To address this issue,
we weight the observations by the number of valid CPS responses. Results for the other variables are not
sensitive to this weighting.17
degree-days as instruments for the demand for housing.
23  We report these results in
column 2 of Table 1.  As expected, the IV estimates are substantially larger, but they still
suggest a very elastic supply of physical structures.
24
If variation in the amount of building activity cannot account for the variation in
construction costs, what does?  It turns out that the supply shifters themselves are very
powerful, accounting for over three-quarters of the variance.  For example, per capita
income at the metropolitan area level is statistically and economically important, with an
elasticity near 0.15 in the IV results.
Interestingly, the share of construction workers that are unionized is an especially
strong predictor of higher construction costs.  Given the highly significant coefficient of
0.45 (IV specification in column 2), a one-standard-deviation higher unionization share
(of about 20 percent) is associated with construction costs that are 9 percent higher (i.e.,
.2*.45=.09).  Union wage premia (Freeman, 1984) or the costs of restrictive work rules
certainly could be directly related to higher construction costs.
25  It is also interesting that
many declining cities have a strongly unionized construction sector.  The correlation
between population growth during both the 1980s and 1990s with the unionization
variable is just over  –0.5.  Yet, one should not necessarily confer a causal interpretation
to the higher costs of unions for the entire effect of this variable.  The impact of unions
                                                          
23 Population seems a natural instrument because depreciation and turnover will be higher in bigger cities,
generating a stronger demand for new units.  The weather, and warm weather especially, has been shown to
be highly correlated with metropolitan growth in recent decades.  Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz (2001) and
Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) provide the details on how this amenity has become an important driver of the
demand for metropolitan location.
24 We also estimated specifications to test for nonlinearities in the relationship between prices and
quantities.  Models that included polynomials of construction costs or a series of 10 dummies for housing
permit deciles were rejected in favor of the linear relationship.
25 For example, Freeman and Medoff (1981) demonstrate that a 1-percentage-point increase in the
unionization rate in the construction sector is associated with a 0.3 percent increase in union wages.
Unions also have effects on productivity and the organization of labor within firms (Freeman and Medoff,
1983).18
on local economies is likely to be complex.  And the extent of unionization may be
associated with other factors such as stricter building codes or some other omitted
political factors that themselves influence building costs.
26
The variable controlling for local expenditures per capita on inspection and
regulation should help control for these factors. These expenditures cover spending on
housing code enforcement and inspection, among other things. We believe such
expenditures are a proxy for the strictness with which local regulations are enforced. The
positive coefficient on this variable is consistent with this view, as when spending on
regulatory enforcement doubles (which is approximately a one-standard-deviation change
or a log change of one unit), construction costs increase by about 2 percent.
It is also noteworthy that these effects hold within region, especially given the strong
spatial correlation of unionization rates.
27  The Northeast (which is the omitted region)
and West census regions are relatively expensive, since the same quality house can be
built for at least 10 percent less in the South and Midwest.
                                                          
26 For example, Burby et al. (2000) report a negative correlation between how strictly building codes are
enforced and the level of new construction in a city.  In addition, the broader point about unions possibly
thriving in environments conducive to high costs is amply illustrated by a recent event in our hometown of
Philadelphia.  The September 9, 2002, Philadelphia Inquirer contained an article entitled “Board no longer
granting variances from PVC pipe” (see the front page of the newspaper from that day).  The article
claimed that Philadelphia’s mayor, in response to appeals from the local plumbers’ union, had pressured
building officials to stop issuing variances for a money-saving construction material called PVC pipe.  PVC
pipe is a plastic sewer pipe that is substantially cheaper and easier to install than the standard cast iron pipe.
The article also noted that PVC pipe cost from $10-$15 per 10-foot length versus about $100 for the same
length of cast iron pipe.  Essentially, the plumbers’ union believed that allowing the cheaper and more
flexible sewer pipe would hurt their members economically—largely because less time would be required
on such jobs.  The Inquirer’s reporter claimed that this issue was relevant for at least 1,500 sewer repair
jobs in the city each year that cost homeowners an average of $3,000.  Using PVC pipe was estimated to
save between $200-$600 per job.  This particular issue is part of a broader debate in Philadelphia to
modernize the building code.  Thus far, the local building trades unions have successfully defeated efforts
at modernization that would result in lower construction costs.  Thus, Philadelphia provides a particularly
apt example of how the presence of a strong union is associated with local political and regulatory
environments that themselves are conducive to high costs.
27 Regional dummies alone account for 51 percent of the variance in construction costs across metropolitan
areas.19
Finally, it is useful to emphasize that our focus here has been on the cross-sectional
variation in construction costs.  Our results do not imply that national increases in
construction activity would not result in higher average input prices nationally, as they
well may (Somerville, 1999). Rather, our conclusion is that relative changes in
construction activity across areas do not change relative construction costs across the
same areas--given the national level of construction. That is what really matters for
decaying cities in the long run (i.e., independent of the business cycle) because it implies
that one should not expect construction costs to fall much and dampen the impact of a
negative demand shock on housing decay.
5. Expenditures on Renovation and Construction Costs
We are now ready to address the core issue of the paper—namely, the impact of
changing construction costs on renovation expenditures.  We have already shown that, in
a strictly financial sense, if the cost of replacing capital is above the value of the newly
installed capital, then it does not make sense to maintain.  However, a potentially
important prior question is whether the relevant cost of capital for reinvestment is that
associated with the average building cost.  Following Henderson (1977) and Margolis
(1981), we assume construction and renovation technologies are similar.
28 However, it is
at least hypothetically possible that the true cost of renovation is determined more by the
prices Home Depot charges for materials than it is by local building costs for new units.
We address this issue in Table 2 which reports results from random effects
specifications that regress the logarithm of mean renovation expenditures on the log of
                                                          
28 Other models, such as in Arnott, Davidson, and Pines (1983), have assumed different technologies for
construction and maintenance. Whether construction costs are good proxies for the cost of renovation is an
empirical matter.20
construction costs.  We use the MSA panel of average house prices from the Metro AHS
files and construction costs from the R.S. Means Company. There is a very strong
relationship between renovation expenditures and constructions costs even when we
control for city average income, year fixed effects (which capture the national evolution
in inflation and the price of raw materials), and MSA random effects that account for
location-specific, time-invariant heterogeneity.
The results from column two, which control for local income, imply that a 1 percent
increase in construction costs is associated with a 0.72 percent increase in
maintenance/renovation expenditures. The fact that this elasticity is below one suggests a
non-zero substitution effect.
29  To see this, note that total renovation expenditures are the
product of the price of renovation ( p - proxied by building costs) and the quantity of
renovation ( () qp). The coefficient reported in the top row of Table 2 can be defined as









pq p qp p
pp q p
,
from which we can retrieve an implied price-elasticity of renovation equal to -0.28 using
the results from the preferred specification in column two.  Even if we assume the impact
of construction costs to be at the bottom end of the 95 percent confidence interval for the
coefficient on construction costs in column two, the consumption of renovation services
still is relatively price-inelastic.
30
                                                          
29 However, we cannot be confident that the coefficient on construction costs is significantly different from
one. We are confident that the results are not driven by omitted variable bias: a fixed effects model reaches
similar results, although the variance of the estimates increases substantially when we discard the cross-
sectional variation (because there are at most three observations over time per metropolitan area in the
panel).
30 In that case, a 1 percent higher level of costs is associated with a 0.38 percent higher level of renovation
expenditures (i.e., 0.38 = 0.72 – (2*0.168), where 0.72 is the coefficient point estimate and 0.168 is the
standard error about that point estimate).  Using the formula from equation (2), the implied price elasticity
increases only to –0.62.21
Table 3 then reports our findings on how sensitive renovation expenditures are to
house values being below building costs. To help answer this question, we created a
dichotomous dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the reported home value is
below what it would cost to replace the entire structure with “economy-quality” materials
and labor.
31  This cost is the product of the unit square footage reported in the AHS and
the Means Company estimate of economy-quality construction cost per square foot in the
relevant metropolitan area and year.
Many households report zero renovation expenditures.  However, it is possible that
the desired or actual level of renovation expenditures is negative, as some owners may be
deliberately running down the capital in their homes.  Because the renovation variable in
the AHS is censored at zero, we propose the following Tobit model,
(15) 
*
ikt k t ikt ikt ikt ikt RA Y B e l V a l X         
with
* 00 ikt ikt Ri f R  ,
and
** 0 ikt ikt ikt RRi f R  ,
where  ikt R is renovation expenditure, 
*
ikt R  is an uncensored latent variable for renovation
expenditures,  k A a MSA fixed effect,  t Y a year fixed effect,  ikt Bel  is a dummy that takes
on a value of one if the unit is valued below construction cost,  ikt Val is the home value,
and  ikt X is a vector of household variables (home age, number of rooms, household
                                                          
31 Strictly speaking, prices need not be below construction costs for owners to want to depreciate their
housing capital.  For example, if value is above cost, but the land is worth more in an alternative (non-
residential) use, letting the physical structure deteriorate can be optimal.  Thus, being below cost is a
sufficient, but not necessary, condition for lack of reinvestment. As we compare a group with values below
cost (the treatment) with the rest of the owner-occupiers (the control), we will understate the impact on
renovation.22
income, unit square footage, and a dummy for the presence of a porch). The subscripts
are ifor the household, k for the metropolitan area, and t for the year.
Column 1 of Table 3 reports our baseline Tobit results.  They include MSA fixed
effects that account for time-invariant, city-specific variables such as tastes, municipal
codes, or disamenities that influence city decline and could be correlated with renovation
expenditures. Year fixed effects control for the fact that the observations are from
different years and for national changes in tastes or renovation quality. We control for
unit-specific variables that are suggested in the renovation literature and for household
income.
32 Finally, because a given unit can appear multiple times in the different waves
of the metropolitan sample, standard errors are clustered by unit.
The results indicate a significantly negative impact of -$240 on renovation
expenditures from being below cost.
33 This is about 12 percent of the mean annual
                                                          
32 For instance, see Mendelsohn (1977), Boehm and Ihlanfeldt (1986), Spivack (1991), Reschovsky (1992),
and Bogdon (1996).
33 Our specification obviously assumes a common treatment for all units whose values fall below
construction costs.  Of course, it need not be the case that everyone is equally marginal in this sense.
Hence, we also estimated a model in which the interaction of the below-cost dummy with the gap between
the value-to-cost ratio and one (i.e., Bel*(1-value/cost)) was included.  In that case, the below-cost dummy
retains its significance, but the interaction term is neither statistically nor economically significant.
Because the data may not be of high enough quality for us to distinguish the impacts associated with small
changes in the extent to which a unit is valued below cost, we also experimented with specifications that
divided the sample of units with values into less fine groupings.  When we did so, we always found bigger
impacts for units with values the furthest below construction costs.  [For example, if we divide the “below
cost units” in half, we find that those in the group with value-to-cost ratios closest to one spent $161 less on
renovation, while those in the other group spent $335 less on renovation.  The cut-off point between these
groups was a value-to-cost ratio of about 0.7.  Both coefficients were statistically significant from zero, but
we could not reject the null that they are equal.  If we divide the “below cost units” into thirds, we find the
same pattern of increasingly negative effects for units with the lowest value-to-cost ratios, but the
coefficient for the group closest to one in value had a t-statistic of only –1.4.]   Unfortunately, it is not clear
whether this is due to true non-monotonicity in the impact or to the fact that attenuation bias from
misclassification is greater for units with value-to-cost ratios close to one.  This issue obviously will matter
for certain policy purposes, including if one wished to estimate the precise amount of the additional
renovation that would result if construction costs were (say) 10 percent lower.  While we leave that policy
simulation exercise to future research because its implementation requires much different data, we can
identify the places with the largest fractions of homes whose “below cost status” would change because of
a drop in construction costs.  See the final section for those findings.23
renovation expenditure of $1,950.
34  The other coefficients also have the expected signs:
older, bigger, more valuable houses with richer inhabitants experience greater
investments in renovation. Average home values and household income are $151,487 and
$63,570 respectively, so the implicit elasticities for renovation at the mean are 0.3 with
respect to home values
35 and 0.4 with respect to income.
36
Our OLS estimate of the impact of construction costs on renovation spending may be
biased upward because of endogeneity and biased downward because of measurement
error.  Endogeneity could be a problem because households that systematically invest less
in home renovations are depreciating their housing stock faster, thereby increasing the
probability that their home values will fall below construction costs.
37  Thus, the below-
cost dummy is endogenous to renovation expenditures despite the fact that we are
controlling for housing value in our reduced-form regression. Consequently, part of the
negative association between the below-cost dummy and renovation might be accounted
for by reverse causation.
As for measurement error, both the numerator and denominator of the below-cost
dummy are highly likely to be noisy.  This variable takes on a value of one if the ratio of
house value to construction cost is less than one.  Some units are likely to be
                                                          
34 While these results are for the aggregate of spending on renovation, we have experimented with models
for the different types of spending (i.e., on additions, alternations, regular maintenance, etc.).  All
regressions for separate renovation categories yield the same qualitative answer--units below replacement
cost receive less investment.  However, we could not discern any interesting patterns for these results, and
the estimates using disaggregated spending data are noisier.
35 If home loans are non-recourse, one could argue that is not value but home equity that matters for
investment. In practice, the AHS data makes it very difficult to calculate this variable. We attempted to
impute home equity values for housing units with fixed-payment mortgages, but the estimate is extremely
noisy and is never significant in the regressions.
36 The later is slightly smaller than Mendelshon’s (1977) estimate of 0.6 and Boehm and Ihlanfeldt’s (1986)
estimate of 0.53.  While both studies use different samples and time frames, we suspect that the inclusion of
MSA fixed effects in our specification accounts for the bulk of the difference.
37 Recent research by Knight and Sirmans (1996) and Gyourko and Tracy (2003) indicates that the impact
of reduced investment in renovation is reflected in lower self-reported house values.24
misclassified because relatively small errors in reporting square footage or home value
can lead us to mistakenly categorize the unit as being above or below cost.  For example,
only a 10 percent underestimate of unit square footage increases value per square foot by
about 11 percent.  We suspect that errors of this magnitude are likely, especially with
respect to unit size, so measurement problems in the below-cost dummy could be
significant, thereby generating potentially severe attenuation bias.
To deal with both problems, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) approach that
exploits a feature of the AHS that allows us to identify other units in the same census
tract.
38  We calculate the average value per square foot for each unit in each year in the
census tract in which the unit is located, and then create an instrument for the below-cost
dummy for home i(denoted _ ikt Bel IV in equation (16)), excluding information on the
unit’s own value.  That is,  _ ikt Bel IV takes on a value of one if the average value of the

















_0 ikt Bel IV otherwise 
This instrument should help us deal with both sources of bias.  First, it lets us obtain
consistent estimates in the presence of endogeneity, as a household’s renovation
expenditures should not affect the rest of the tract’s average housing values.
39  Second, it
                                                          
38 We do not know the identity of the specific census tract, only that a cluster of units is located in a
common tract.
39 We do not believe that segregation with respect to tastes for renovation is an issue. Nevertheless, we will
control for neighborhood-specific characteristics (such as possibly omitted neighborhood-specific tastes for
renovation) in the unit fixed effects regressions reported below.25
helps deal with the attenuation-bias problem.  Averaging by tract should yield cleaner
values of the below-cost dummy.  If the tract’s average house value is below construction
cost and the below-cost variable is below one, then we can be much more confident that
the unit is, in fact, valued below construction cost.
 We then employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation using the Tobit model
(Nelson and Olson (1978)).  In the first stage, we regress the below-cost dummy variable
on the instrument and the other explanatory variables.  We then use the fitted variables in
the second stage with the main Tobit model.  Bootstap standard errors are reported based
on 200 repetitions of the 2SLS procedure.
The results from this IV approach are reported in the second column of Table 3.  The
coefficient on the instrumented value-to-cost ratio becomes much larger (in absolute
value) and remains highly statistically significant.  Units with values below construction
cost now are estimated to have renovation-related expenditures that are $911 lower—or
nearly 50 percent of the annual mean expenditure level.  This suggests that the
attenuation bias in the OLS specification is very important.
It is noteworthy that the results in Table 3 are not simply capturing the impact of
lower housing values on renovation, since house values, not just unit traits, are being
controlled for.  And the findings are robust to including nonlinearities in house value.
40
In fact, additional analysis confirmed that the relationship between renovation and home
values is strongly linear.
41  Note also that units with the same value can differ in the
                                                          
40 For example, we experimented with up to third order polynomials of house value.  These terms were not
statistically significant, nor did they have a material impact on the estimated impact of being below cost.
Notice that this strategy is akin to a regression discontinuity design, where we are also using the between-
city variance in construction costs.
41 After introducing 20 dummies for each corresponding value quantile into our regressions, we still could
reject that they are significant at the 5 percent or 10 percent confidence levels.  We have also plotted the26
below-cost dummy because of differences in construction costs between city and over
time.
42
Robustness Checks of the Results
One concern with our estimation strategy is that the results might be being driven by
omitted tastes for housing services that are negatively correlated with the below-cost
dummy.  Consequently, we estimated a specification for a home expenditure that is
related to the consumption of house services, yet does not have an investment aspect.  In
the case of a pure consumption expense, we would not expect to find any significant
relationship between being below replacement cost and expenditure on the item in the
absence of the specification bias just discussed.
Our “placebo” of choice is the annual cost of electricity, which is reasonably well
reported in the AHS.  Consumption of electricity is directly connected with the time spent
at home and with the consumption of various home-related services.  The insignificant
and positive coefficient (row 1, Table 4) certainly provides no evidence in support of the
possibility that omitted tastes for housing-related consumption are likely to be accounting
for our results here.
We also pursue a second approach to investigating this issue, this one exploiting the
longitudinal aspect of the metropolitan files of the AHS.  Specifically, we estimate a
fixed-effects model, as in equation (17), which takes into account unobserved
heterogeneity in the household’s tastes for housing services
                                                                                                                                                                            
relationship between average value and average renovation expenditure for 200 quantiles of value.  A
strong linearity remains.
42 If we restrict ourselves to the common support (in terms of the value distribution) of the below-cost and
above-cost groups, this point is more dramatic as there is always a unit in the alternate group with
comparable housing values. The regression results in this case are –$170 (-$1,030) in the OLS (IV)
specification, which are very similar to the findings reported in Table 3.27
(17)  ikt i t ikt ikt ikt ikt RA Y B e l V a l X          ,
where i A is a household fixed effect and all other variables are as defined above. The
fixed-effects estimator is identified on the within-unit variation in the explanatory
variables.
43  Table 5 reports results from this specification, with the relationship between
the below-cost dummy and renovation remaining negative and generally strong.  Because
the variables used in the fixed effects regressions are deviations from the group means,
measurement error is likely to be exacerbated, and that is what we find.  The  IV
estimates in particular are very similar to those reported in Table 3 but are less precisely
estimated.
Note that the OLS and IV results in the first two columns of Table 5 use the variance
from units that changed their below-cost status.  If households take time to adjust their
investment decisions after their units change from above to below cost (or vice versa),
then those estimates may understate the long-run impact of being below cost.  To
investigate this possibility, we exploit information for the units that did not change their
below-cost status.  Each unit can appear with full information in either of at most three
waves of the metropolitan files of the AHS (during the period for which we have data).
Each wave typically is four years apart.  Thus, we can create a variable that takes on the
value of the number of the corresponding sample wave for each unit. We then interact
this variable with the below-cost dummy and include it in the specification reported in
column 3 of Table 5.  This allows us to identify whether there is a trend effect, not just a
level effect, of being below cost on maintenance.  The results suggest that this does seem
                                                          
43 Notice that we cannot deal with the censoring of the renovation variable here, since the sign of the
difference between a zero value and the group mean that contains other zeros is indeterminate. This is not a
major problem in the empirical specification. OLS estimates of the parameters reported in column 1 of28
to be the case, since the difference in renovation expenditures between units that are
always below cost and units that are always above cost increases by about $100 each
wave (or about $25 per year).
We close this section with an analysis of two additional issues pertaining to the
reliability of these findings.  One, in the fixed effects specification, derives from the
possibility that changes in the “below-cost” dummy could be capturing long-term trends
(not levels) in neighborhood quality that themselves could be correlated with (or even
caused) by trends in the demand for renovation at the local level.  The other arises from
the possibility that owners of below cost units could be substituting “sweat equity” for
cash spending on renovation.  If so, the decline in monetary expenditures need not reflect
an overall drop in reinvestment in one’s home.
Table 6 sheds light on the first issue by reporting the transition matrix into and out of
below-cost status. Units can appear in the sample once (T=1), twice (T=1,2) or three
times (T=1,2,3). We show all possible transitions for our sample and match these to the
average expenditures in renovation.  It is striking that all transitions are consistent with a
behavioral story of responses in renovation to changes in below-cost status. Even
medium-lived (4-year) transitions in the below-cost status (transitions 1,0,1 and 0,1,0 in
the table) are associated with changes in renovation expenditures in the right direction.
As for the possibility that total investment in renovation may not have fallen, we can
provide two pieces of evidence.  First, we draw on the implications of Bogdan’s (1996)
research into the decision to hire outsiders for renovation projects.  She reports that a
number of variables—unit square footage, house value, household income, and select
                                                                                                                                                                            
Table 5 yield similar results and, if anything, underestimate the impact of the below-cost dummy on
renovations.29
household traits such as education, race, and household composition—are important
predictors of the propensity to “do it yourself.”  We already explicitly control for the first
three of her factors, and have estimated more extensive models (not reported here) that
include the other variables, without changes in the coefficient of interest.
44
While our models with unit fixed effects should control for any household-level
propensity to use “sweat equity,” we also estimated a linear probability model of the
propensity to “do it yourself.”  The dependent variable was a dichotomous dummy for
whether owners reported doing any renovations themselves.  The independent variables
included the below cost dummy and all the other variables from Table 3;  year and MSA
fixed effects also were controlled for.  We found a small, but statistically significant
negative correlation between being below cost and “doing it yourself.”  Not only is there
no evidence of owners in below-cost units substituting “sweat equity” for cash
reinvestment, but the data suggest that “do it yourself” efforts fall along with cash
expenditures for such owners.  Hence, it seems likely that our estimates are lower bounds
on the overall drop in renovation effort among below-cost units.
6. The Distribution of Home Values: How Empirically Relevant Are
“Fringe” Areas?
Because the impact of supply shocks on revitalization will be greater in areas in
which home values tend to be close to replacement costs, we summarize the distribution
of the value-to-cost ratio for the 43 metropolitan areas from the 1984-1995 AHS Metro
                                                          
44 Specifically, if we also control for race, the presence of a female head, the number of persons in the
household, and the head’s education, the coefficient on the below-cost dummy is not affected in a material
way.30
samples in Tables 7 and 8.  Table 7 focuses on central cities, while Table 8 pertains to the
outlying areas of each metropolitan area.
The markets are sorted in descending order by the fraction of their housing stocks
that we calculate have values between 90-100 percent of construction costs in the area
(see the numbers in the middle column of the tables), with a fuller description of the
distribution in the other columns.  We choose this particular cut-off point because we
think it relevant for considering a number of changes that could influence construction
costs in an area.  Recall that a one-standard-deviation decline in construction sector
unionization rates was associated with a 9 percent decline in construction costs (see Table
1).  In addition, changing regional status from the Northeast to the South was associated
with construction costs that were at least 10 percent lower.  One can also readily imagine
various targeted supply-side policies that could reduce construction costs by at least 10
percent, thereby taking the values of these homes from being below to above replacement
costs.
Among the central cities, Milwaukee has the highest fraction of its owner-
occupied units—at 14.4 percent--with values between 90-100 percent of construction
costs (Table 7).  Over one-quarter of Milwaukee’s units are between 80-100 percent of
construction costs.  It also is clear from Table 8 that there are various suburban markets
with relatively large fractions of units having values just below replacement costs.
Buffalo is the leading example, with 11 percent of its units priced less than 10 percent
below costs and another 10 percent no less than 80 percent of replacement costs.
That said, it also is apparent that modest changes in construction costs are
unlikely to change the “below-cost status” of many units in a number of other markets.31
And it is noteworthy that not all of these markets are growing areas with relatively high
prices.  For example, it should be no surprise to find that the Seattle, San Francisco, San
Diego, Los Angeles, Anaheim, New York City, and Riverside markets have virtually no
units priced anywhere below construction costs.  However, the situation is only little
different in Detroit.  Only 2 percent of homes in the central city of Detroit have values
between 90-100 percent of construction costs, with another 3 percent are priced between
80-90 percent of costs.  Modest changes in construction costs clearly will not affect
whether the vast majority of Detroit’s homes are valued below or above replacement
value because 84 percent have value-to-cost ratios below 0.7.  For markets such as these,
it is difficult to imagine any realistic supply-side policy that could change the
“below-cost status” of enough units to materially affect renovation spending in the
market area.
Figures 4-6 then plot kernel density estimates of the distribution of value-to-cost
ratios for three types of cities.  Los Angeles represents the first group and is the prototype
of a market experiencing rapid growth and in which land prices are high.  Figure 4
highlights that the bulk of the mass in that distribution is to the right of 1 (where value
equals replacement cost).  Figure 5 graphs the kernel density for Detroit, a city in obvious
decline, but one in which the decline has been so severe that values are so far below costs
on average that positive supply-side shocks are unlikely to lead to much of an increase in
renovation effort.  Figure 6 then reports on Philadelphia, which like Milwaukee is a
declining area.  In this case, much of the mass of the value distribution is close to
replacement cost.  It is in cases such as this that the evolution of the supply side can play
an important role in determining whether many areas of the city will decline or be32
redeveloped. The data in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that there are many areas similar to
Philadelphia for which the maintenance and renovation expenditure effect identified
above is likely to be quite relevant.  Most of these places are in decline, but with
downturns not so severe as to render irrelevant improvements in cost conditions.  In
places such as Milwaukee and Philadelphia, modestly lower construction costs certainly
will not change basic urban trends, but the level of construction costs is likely to be a key
factor that determines whether many of their neighborhoods will experience any
significant reinvestment in their housing stocks.  An upper bound estimate of the impact
of a supply side change that lowered construction costs by ten percent would be the sum
of the 2.8 percent additional renovation spending from the own price elasticity (of –0.28
from Table 2) and the $911 for each home valued between 90-100 percent of replacement
costs whose house value is pushed above costs.  Among cities with at least five percent of
the stock changing its ‘below cost status’ from a 10 percent decline in construction costs,
the increase in renovation spending ranges from 5.2 percent (Tampa) to 9.5 percent
(Milwaukee).
45
All this strongly suggests that urban scholars and policymakers should begin to focus
attention on the drivers of high construction costs.
7. Conclusions
Negative housing demand shocks that have afflicted many American cities in the 20
th
century have received much attention in the urban and real estate literatures.  In this
                                                          
45 There are upper bound estimates because they presume that all affected units are marginal.  In
Philadelphia’s case the calculation suggest that renovation expenditures in the city would be higher by 6.4
percent--2.8 percent from the own price effect and 3.6 percent from the impact of 7.6 percent of the city’s
owned units changing their ‘below cost status’. Even if the true effect of the latter impact is only half of
what we estimate, the influence is economically meaningful.33
paper, we examined the role of housing supply in declining areas.  Construction costs
were shown to be very insensitive to building activity, suggesting that the supply of
structures is very elastic.  Unions and regional factors were shown to significantly
influence construction costs across areas, with income and regulatory effort playing lesser
roles.
We then estimated that building costs are a very important determinant of
renovation effort across metropolitan areas.  Such spending increases by 0.72 percent
when building costs go up by 1 percent, implying a price elasticity of –0.28.  In addition,
households were found to reduce their investment in renovation when home values go
below construction costs--by nearly 50 percent of average annual expenditures in our
preferred specification. The result is robust to using instrumental variables that account
for endogeneity and for the attenuation bias introduced by measurement error. The results
do not hinge on omitted household characteristics and are robust to including household
fixed effects.
Finally, we present evidence on the distribution of house prices to construction costs
implying that supply-side policies that generated a 10 percent reduction in construction
costs could have a considerable impact on housing reinvestment in some areas.  The
impact will be greater, the flatter the distribution of the value-to-cost ratio in the area.  A
large number of older, manufacturing cities from Philadelphia to Minneapolis have
relatively large fractions of their housing stock valued just below replacement costs.  It is
in these places that at least some neighborhoods are likely to become viable candidates
for reinvestment if construction costs could be lowered even modestly.34
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Log Total Housing permits at T-1 0.003 0.027
(0.006) (0.008)***
Log MSA per Capita Income 0.249 0.15
(0.046)*** (0.051)***
Share Union Construction Workers 0.409 0.448
(0.050)*** (0.050)***












Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The missing regional dumy correspond to the Northeast
Observations are weighted by number of responses to CPS union question.
IV: Log permits instrumented with log population and log cooling degree days
TABLE 1
Accounting for Construction Costs
Log Cost Sq.Ft. Economy 2000 ft. 
Home(1) (2)
Log City Construction Cost, 2000 Sq.ft. unit 1.152 0.719
(0.188)*** (0.168)***




Year FE yes yes
MSA random effects yes yes
R-squared 0.52 0.67
Observations 108 108
Number of MSA 43 43
Implied price elasticity -0.28
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Log City Average 
Renovation Expenditures
Impact of Construction Costs on Renovation
TABLE 2(1) (2)
Tobit IV Tobit
Unit is below economy cost, 1 = yes -238.803 -911.47
(60.134)*** (265.928)***
Property value 0.004 0.003
(0.001)*** ( 0.0006)***
Estimated home age 26.429 28.661
(1.426)*** ( 1.268)***
Number of rooms in unit 209.413 188.939
(17.802)*** (16.274)***
Household Income 0.013 0.013
(0.001)*** (.0006)***
Patio or porch, 1 = yes 279.019 215.97
(61.365)*** (51.18424)***




MSA Fixed Effects yes yes
Year Fixed Effects yes yes
Observations 153647 141963
Robust (clustered by unit) standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Average Renovation ($)
TABLE 3
The Impact of Being Below Cost on Renovation
The average expenditure in renovation in the sample is $ 1,945 (2,387 conditional on a 
nonzero value).Annual Cost of 
Electricity
IV
Unit is below economy cost, 1 = yes 38.928
(39.800)
Property value(sample unit only) 0.00094
(0.00007)***
Estimated home age -3.703
(0.158)***




Patio or porch, 1 = yes 31.266
(6.864)***




MSA Fixed Effects yes
Year Fixed Effects yes
Observations 147293
R-squared 0.31
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The sample average annual expenditure in electricity is $1256.60.
TABLE 4
A Placebo: Expenditures on Electricity(1) (2) (3)
"Stable" Units
FE FE IV FE
Unit is below economy cost, 1 = yes -138.577 -969.993
(44.195)*** (609.21)
Property value(sample unit only) 0.004 0.003 0.005
(0.000)*** (0.001)** (0.000)***
Estimated home age 1.362 2.111 0.408
(9.160) (9.794) (10.792)
Number of rooms in unit 163.616 160.369 155.203
(12.831)*** (13.547)*** (14.565)***
Household Income 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Patio or porch, 1 = yes 153.085 134.657 184.865
(41.975)*** (44.294)*** (48.704)***
Size of unit, sq. ft. 1.574 1.63 2.045
(0.090)*** (0.134)*** (0.114)***
Below Cost Dummy x Sample Wave -105.852
(44.882)**
Constant -3,518.62 -3,142.99 -4,547.97
(296.216)*** (355.681)*** (348.231)***
Unit FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Observations 153633 141949 132442
Number of Units 82485 76677 73728
R-squared 0.02 0 0.02
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
"Stable" Units are units that do not experience a change in the below cost dummy (always above or under).
Sample Wave can take values 1,2 or 3, and refers to the number of times a unit has been sampled
 Expenditures in Renovation
All
TABLE 5
Within-Units Changes Number of Units T=1 T=2 T=3 T=1 T=2 T=3
25259 0 - - 1430 - -
4994 1 - - 1900 - -
25546 0 0 - 2132 2071 -
3574 1 1 - 1597 1382 -
2300 1 0 - 1620 1996 -
1745 0 1 - 1903 1425 -
1231 1 0 0 1639 2074 1935
688 1 1 0 1510 1763 1871
498 0 1 1 1626 1311 1194
758 0 0 1 1800 1730 1320
299 1 0 1 1342 1609 1466
638 0 1 0 1876 1439 1966
13361 0 0 0 2047 2247 2062
1598 1 1 1 1581 1511 1359
82489
Note: Units can be sampled up to 3 times (3 waves)
Below-Economy Dummy Average Maintenance+Repairs
TABLE 6
Transition Matrix: Total Expenditure in Renovation -- Units Sampled 
More than Once<0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1 1-1.1 1.1-1.2 1.2-1.3 >1.3
Milwaukee 21.70% 10.09% 12.38% 14.40% 11.41% 7.58% 6.24% 16.20%
Minneapolis 6.17% 2.91% 6.32% 11.24% 10.66% 13.35% 9.31% 40.04%
Portland (OR) 10.37% 7.28% 9.72% 11.06% 11.10% 9.01% 7.69% 33.77%
Rochester (NY) 10.26% 6.57% 7.71% 9.78% 11.65% 6.64% 10.83% 36.56%
Birmingham 17.78% 7.06% 7.99% 9.66% 9.11% 8.49% 7.39% 32.53%
Buffalo 51.55% 10.30% 7.91% 8.93% 2.80% 3.11% 3.02% 12.37%
Cincinnati 15.68% 6.29% 7.63% 8.92% 10.19% 7.47% 5.98% 37.85%
St. Louis 23.48% 11.68% 8.66% 8.63% 11.25% 5.99% 6.05% 24.27%
Cleveland 48.29% 12.29% 10.17% 8.10% 6.30% 5.03% 3.27% 6.54%
Kansas City 17.89% 6.33% 7.85% 7.65% 8.11% 6.94% 7.98% 37.25%
Pittsburgh 30.01% 14.09% 6.85% 7.58% 5.50% 8.47% 5.41% 22.10%
Columbus (OH) 14.09% 6.73% 6.95% 7.53% 7.38% 7.26% 6.86% 43.20%
San Antonio 8.26% 4.05% 6.26% 7.44% 7.56% 9.25% 7.89% 49.30%
Philadelphia 27.15% 6.43% 6.67% 7.29% 8.82% 7.34% 5.84% 30.46%
Indianapolis 15.09% 5.95% 6.38% 6.87% 6.99% 6.66% 7.60% 44.45%
Baltimore 13.06% 5.28% 4.17% 6.75% 10.71% 9.21% 6.96% 43.84%
Chicago 15.10% 8.73% 6.34% 6.75% 6.47% 5.80% 4.59% 46.21%
Salt Lake City 1.57% 3.35% 4.58% 6.69% 7.79% 7.10% 9.30% 59.62%
Houston 10.54% 4.44% 5.51% 6.09% 6.79% 7.27% 7.74% 51.62%
Memphis 8.71% 4.27% 5.09% 6.08% 7.93% 7.83% 8.09% 52.01%
Tampa 4.10% 2.44% 4.04% 4.86% 5.65% 9.55% 6.24% 63.13%
Providence 9.57% 5.10% 7.42% 4.73% 6.15% 5.28% 6.00% 55.76%
Miami 6.08% 0.56% 0.56% 4.58% 2.62% 0.62% 4.86% 80.13%
Oklahoma City 8.37% 3.58% 4.25% 4.37% 5.39% 6.47% 9.11% 58.46%
Fort Worth 9.59% 4.30% 4.76% 3.89% 5.58% 6.05% 7.42% 58.41%
Dallas 3.94% 2.57% 3.85% 3.63% 4.55% 4.96% 6.75% 69.77%
Atlanta 9.99% 5.02% 1.78% 3.20% 3.57% 3.34% 4.12% 69.00%
New Orleans 2.55% 1.42% 2.47% 3.18% 2.71% 4.36% 6.50% 76.80%
Boston 5.57% 1.94% 3.29% 2.89% 3.52% 5.77% 1.84% 75.18%
Hartford 3.18% 1.47% 0.00% 2.49% 2.03% 2.31% 4.88% 83.65%
Phoenix 2.98% 1.27% 2.38% 2.37% 3.82% 4.52% 6.51% 76.14%
Detroit 83.65% 6.96% 3.14% 2.18% 1.17% 1.22% 0.34% 1.34%
Norfolk 3.15% 0.54% 1.09% 2.13% 1.88% 3.46% 4.42% 83.34%
Denver 0.95% 1.75% 1.95% 1.92% 3.89% 4.77% 8.70% 76.06%
Seattle 0.66% 0.76% 1.46% 1.54% 1.40% 3.76% 6.93% 83.48%
Washington 3.29% 0.12% 2.70% 1.52% 2.38% 2.12% 3.52% 84.35%
San Francisco 1.64% 0.18% 0.36% 0.70% 0.71% 2.02% 1.10% 93.30%
San Diego 0.32% 0.00% 0.08% 0.21% 0.16% 0.30% 0.56% 98.38%
Los Angeles 1.99% 0.17% 0.43% 0.09% 0.22% 0.70% 1.09% 95.29%
Anaheim 1.01% 0.23% 0.23% 0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 0.00% 98.26%
New York City 2.37% 1.06% 1.96% 0.00% 2.76% 1.91% 3.00% 86.95%
Riverside 0.00% 0.00% 0.76% 0.00% 0.77% 0.42% 1.31% 96.74%
The Distribution of Value/Cost Ratios
TABLE 7
CENTRAL CITIES<0.7 0.7-0.8 0.8-0.9 0.9-1 1-1.1 1.1-1.2 1.2-1.3 >1.3
Buffalo 14.68% 9.80% 9.95% 11.08% 10.79% 9.84% 6.46% 27.41%
St. Louis 11.26% 6.56% 9.04% 9.86% 9.45% 8.14% 7.49% 38.21%
Salt Lake City 2.96% 3.66% 6.77% 9.44% 10.47% 10.58% 9.84% 46.28%
Cleveland 6.49% 6.03% 6.47% 9.27% 9.43% 9.71% 8.24% 44.35%
Kansas City 10.14% 5.99% 6.36% 8.75% 9.11% 10.69% 9.73% 39.23%
Cincinnati 8.69% 4.09% 7.28% 8.54% 7.28% 8.51% 7.58% 48.02%
Detroit 10.59% 6.66% 8.18% 8.31% 8.86% 8.65% 6.76% 41.99%
Pittsburgh 21.50% 9.60% 9.71% 8.16% 8.36% 7.06% 5.88% 29.73%
Houston 6.47% 4.20% 6.83% 8.05% 9.29% 8.67% 8.47% 48.03%
Minneapolis 2.99% 2.44% 5.11% 7.72% 10.15% 11.07% 9.87% 50.63%
Milwaukee 1.47% 2.25% 3.58% 6.22% 10.69% 10.89% 10.59% 54.31%
Birmingham 10.09% 4.23% 4.73% 5.90% 6.81% 8.19% 7.75% 52.31%
Indianapolis 6.88% 2.91% 3.98% 5.69% 5.98% 7.47% 7.19% 59.90%
Providence 3.65% 3.11% 3.78% 5.45% 4.63% 5.41% 4.95% 69.02%
Rochester (NY) 5.21% 3.93% 4.99% 5.41% 6.62% 7.88% 7.77% 58.19%
Oklahoma City 5.82% 2.71% 3.78% 5.41% 5.38% 7.31% 8.14% 61.46%
Portland (OR) 2.80% 1.41% 3.69% 4.99% 7.83% 9.61% 10.86% 58.80%
Columbus (OH) 6.68% 4.29% 4.29% 4.63% 7.12% 7.45% 7.79% 57.75%
Philadelphia 5.71% 2.20% 3.47% 4.19% 5.39% 5.15% 6.12% 67.77%
Tampa 2.03% 1.20% 2.64% 3.47% 5.36% 7.53% 6.45% 71.31%
New Orleans 2.46% 1.31% 2.83% 3.40% 5.08% 6.44% 7.18% 71.30%
San Antonio 3.00% 1.40% 3.27% 3.15% 4.09% 6.31% 4.29% 74.49%
Chicago 2.77% 1.81% 2.05% 3.13% 3.71% 3.51% 4.10% 78.92%
Fort Worth 2.40% 1.22% 1.47% 2.85% 4.18% 5.73% 7.88% 74.27%
Denver 1.00% 1.01% 1.51% 2.78% 4.46% 7.81% 9.13% 72.30%
Atlanta 2.78% 1.16% 1.43% 2.38% 3.64% 4.27% 6.14% 78.19%
Boston 1.93% 0.92% 1.51% 2.36% 2.76% 3.42% 3.46% 83.64%
Memphis 3.83% 1.30% 1.56% 2.34% 4.41% 5.85% 6.82% 73.90%
Baltimore 2.80% 0.91% 1.37% 2.32% 2.62% 3.65% 4.08% 82.25%
Seattle 0.81% 0.55% 0.78% 2.01% 3.62% 4.13% 5.42% 82.68%
Dallas 1.89% 0.67% 1.24% 1.91% 2.85% 4.00% 6.22% 81.23%
Riverside 1.04% 0.39% 0.81% 1.48% 2.33% 2.91% 3.83% 87.20%
Miami 2.28% 0.74% 1.67% 1.34% 2.22% 3.90% 4.22% 83.65%
New York City 2.26% 1.30% 1.78% 1.18% 1.76% 1.59% 2.35% 87.78%
Norfolk 1.66% 0.74% 0.54% 0.98% 1.33% 1.83% 2.34% 90.59%
Phoenix 0.97% 0.43% 0.51% 0.97% 1.53% 3.37% 4.01% 88.21%
Washington 1.27% 0.45% 0.52% 0.78% 1.25% 1.61% 2.08% 92.05%
Newark 2.71% 0.44% 0.32% 0.55% 0.63% 0.77% 0.99% 93.60%
Hartford 0.87% 0.18% 0.42% 0.55% 0.72% 1.91% 1.93% 93.42%
San Francisco 0.92% 0.14% 0.36% 0.30% 0.42% 0.47% 0.80% 96.59%
Los Angeles 0.98% 0.13% 0.10% 0.18% 0.40% 0.51% 0.97% 96.73%
Anaheim 0.97% 0.13% 0.05% 0.10% 0.21% 0.18% 0.10% 98.25%
San Diego 0.50% 0.06% 0.16% 0.05% 0.28% 0.19% 0.31% 98.45%
TABLE 8




















1 Detroit 0.53 0.94 1.12 0.35 85 1 San Francisco 72.88
2 Buffalo 0.67 0.82 0.97 0.50 84 2 New York City 67.46
3 Cleveland 0.77 0.73 1.26 0.21 84 3 Anaheim 66.76
4 Providence 0.98 0.54 1.21 0.27 84 4 Riverside 66.36
5 Philadelphia 1.00 0.50 1.37 0.18 85 5 San Diego 65.09
6 Pittsburgh 1.05 0.49 1.06 0.42 86 6 Los Angeles 64.92
7 St. Louis 1.03 0.45 1.24 0.27 87 7 Boston 63.68
8 Newark 1.16 0.43 3.07 0.03 87 8 Portland (OR) 61.87
9 Milwaukee 1.01 0.37 1.37 0.07 84 9 Hartford 61.35
10 Birmingham 1.17 0.36 1.42 0.20 84 10 Seattle 60.42
11 Columbus (OH) 1.22 0.35 1.40 0.17 87 11 Minneapolis 60.32
12 Chicago 1.36 0.34 1.85 0.07 87 12 Newark 58.32
13 Kansas City 1.19 0.33 1.21 0.23 86 13 Cleveland 57.38
14 Indianapolis 1.17 0.33 1.36 0.18 84 14 Chicago 56.94
15 Cincinnati 1.23 0.31 1.29 0.24 86 15 Rochester (NY) 56.91
16 Portland (OR) 1.18 0.26 1.38 0.10 86 16 Pittsburgh 56.84
17 Rochester (NY) 1.17 0.25 1.37 0.18 86 17 Philadelphia 56.41
18 Baltimore 1.38 0.25 1.85 0.07 87 18 Denver 56.23
19 Memphis 1.34 0.21 1.46 0.09 84 19 St. louis 56.22
20 Houston 1.53 0.18 1.45 0.16 87 20 Detroit 56.00
21 Atlanta 1.99 0.17 1.77 0.06 87 21 Buffalo 55.62
22 Boston 1.74 0.17 1.89 0.06 85 22 Providence 55.26
23 San Antonio 1.48 0.16 1.89 0.03 86 23 Kansas City 54.39
24 Fort Worth 1.62 0.13 1.78 0.04 85 24 New Orleans 54.25
25 Minneapolis 1.32 0.13 1.36 0.11 85 25 Cincinnati 54.12
26 Tampa 1.59 0.10 1.65 0.07 85 26 Washington 54.08
27 Oklahoma City 1.68 0.10 1.72 0.07 84 27 Phoenix 53.59
28 Dallas 2.08 0.09 1.89 0.04 85 28 Columbus (OH) 53.59
29 Miami 2.12 0.08 1.91 0.05 86 29 Houston 53.45
30 Phoenix 1.82 0.07 1.81 0.02 85 30 Dallas 53.25
31 Hartford 2.03 0.07 2.35 0.02 87 31 Miami 53.10
32 Norfolk 1.78 0.07 1.85 0.06 84 32 Tampa 53.05
33 New York City 2.70 0.06 2.55 0.06 87 33 Milwaukee 52.08
34 Salt Lake City 1.68 0.06 1.48 0.08 84 34 Indianapolis 51.80
35 Washington 2.49 0.05 1.95 0.03 85 35 Baltimore 51.68
36 Seattle 1.74 0.05 1.65 0.03 87 36 Fort Worth 51.54
37 New Orleans 1.99 0.04 1.70 0.05 86 37 Salt Lake City 50.95
38 Denver 1.88 0.03 1.71 0.03 86 38 San Antonio 50.85
39 San Francisco 2.55 0.03 2.50 0.02 85 39 Memphis 49.89
40 Los Angeles 2.83 0.02 2.56 0.01 85 40 Oklahoma City 49.61
41 Anaheim 2.39 0.01 2.74 0.01 86 41 Atlanta 48.39
42 San Diego 2.60 0.01 2.46 0.01 87 42 Birmingham 47.99
43 Riverside 1.87 0.00 1.79 0.03 86 43 Norfolk 46.29
Notes: Data from Metropolitan AHS samples (first year after 1984 in which the MSA is sampled). All values in real 2001 dollars. Construction costs for 
economy home (lowest cost available).
Appendix TABLE 1












1 Chicago 55.72% 24 San Diego 22.88%
2 Buffalo 50.63% 25 New Orleans 19.18%
3 Minneapolis 48.39% 26 Columbus (OH) 17.13%
4 Detroit 48.17% 27 Riverside 16.19%
5 Paterson 47.93% 28 Baltimore 15.10%
6 Milwaukee 45.58% 29 Denver 14.48%
7 New York City 43.94% 30 Washington 14.24%
8 St. Louis 43.13% 31 Anaheim 11.53%
9 Cleveland 38.43% 32 Norfolk 10.71%
10 San Francisco 37.74% 33 Miami 10.31%
11 Indianapolis 34.33% 34 Memphis 9.52%
12 Seattle 33.85% 35 Houston 9.32%
13 Philadelphia 33.54% 36 Phoenix 8.29%
14 Newark 31.55% 37 Salt Lake City 7.67%
15 Boston 30.89% 38 Atlanta 7.50%
16 Portland (OR) 30.86% 39 Tampa 4.84%
17 Hartford 30.65% 40 Orlando 4.41%
18 Pittsburgh 30.56% 41 Dallas 4.30%
19 Sacramento 30.48% 42 Nashville-Davidson 3.54%
20 Rochester (NY) 30.05% 43 Fort Worth 3.27%
21 Cincinnati 28.62% 44 Charlotte (NC) 2.85%
22 Los Angeles 27.42% 45 Fort Lauderdale 1.61%
23 Kansas City 27.31% 46 Greensboro 1.33%
47 San Antonio 0.00%
Appendix TABLE 2
Unionization in Major Cities (construction sector)
Notes: Cities with more than 1 million population in 1992. The sample correlation between the union share in 
construction and population growth between 1980 and 1990 is -0.51. The sample correlation between the union 
share and the share of units below 90% of construction costs is 0.36.FIGURE 1: Equilibrium in the Residential Market
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Variable Data Notes Source Tables
Log Total Housing Permits
at T-1
New housing permits at the metropolitan





Log MSA per Capita
Income





Average share of respondents in
construction sector reporting union







Expenditures on regulation and inspection
of private establishments for the
protection of the public or to prevent
hazardous conditions, at the MSA level.




Regional Dummies We match each with the corresponding
Census Region.
U.S. Census Bureau T.1




Log of the construction cost per square










MSA average of AHS reported total
household income. Only for MSA with 50







MSA average of sum of yearly
expenditures in renovation by housing
unit. Single unit (attached and detached),
owner-occupied homes. See ±  on how







Owner-occupied, single units (attached or







Dummy on Unit Below
Cost
Takes value 1 if the value/cost ratio is
below 1. See ‡ on how we construct the












Property Value Self-reported home value. The variable is
topcoded. Topcodes change each year.
Typically, 3 percent of the observations
fall in the topcode. Note that the value-to-
cost ratio for these observations is always
above one. The results are robust to







Estimated Home Age We estimate building age as the sample
year minus the estimated year of
construction. The estimated year in which
the unit was built is the midpoint of the
range given by the AHS. We assume that
the year of construction is 1908 if the





T.5Number of rooms in unit Number of rooms (top-coded at 21; only 1






Income of all Household
Members Including Non-
relatives
As reported in the AHS. Top-coded at

















Annual Cost of Electricity 12 times the self-reported average






* Expenditures on Inspection
Correspond to local expenditures on regulation and inspection of private establishments for the protection
of the public or to prevent hazardous conditions, not classified elsewhere under another major function.
Examples include the inspection of plans, permits, construction, or installations related to buildings,
housing, plumbing, electrical systems, gas, air conditioning, boilers, elevators, electric power plant sites,
nuclear facilities, weights and measures, etc.; regulation of financial institutions, taxicabs, public service
corporations, insurance companies, private utilities (telephone, electric, etc.), and other corporations;
licensing, examination, and regulation of professional occupations, including health-related ones like
doctors, nurses, barbers, beauticians, etc.; inspection and regulation or working conditions and occupational
hazards; motor vehicle inspection and weighing unless handled by a police agency; regulation and
enforcement of liquor laws and sale of alcoholic beverages unless handled by a police department.
The following expenditures are excluded: distinctive license revenue collection activities; regulatory or
inspection activities related to food establishments or to environmental health; motor vehicle inspection,
liquor law enforcement, and other regulatory type activities of police agencies; regulatory and inspection
activities related to other major functions, such as fire inspections, health permits, water permits, and the
like.
The variable is reported at the metropolitan area level. The expenditures are reported for all local
governments in a county by the Census of Governments (1992). All local governments within the county
area are added together, and the duplicative inter-local amounts are removed. We then sum expenditures for
all counties in a MSA using the 1999 county-based definitions from the Census.
‡ Value-to-cost ratio: Metro AHS Data
a.  Creating adjusted house values
Two important adjustments to the house values reported in the AHS involved controlling for depreciation
on older structures and the fact that owners typically over-estimate their house value.  Recall that we need
to know if the value of a unit is above construction costs were it to be rebuilt under current specifications
(such as current building codes).  Thus, we need an adjusted value that corresponds to the price of a newly
built unit.  It is only adjusted value that is properly comparable with current construction costs for the
purposes of obtaining implicit land values.
Goodman and Ittner (1992) report that the typical household reports home values that are 6 percent higher
than actual market prices. Thus, we divide reported values by 1.06 to correct for this bias.  Restricting
ourselves to housing units with reported square footage, we then regress the logarithm of the value per
square foot on age and vintage dummies (age effects are identified, as we have repeated time observations
of units in the same vintage). The omitted vintage is 1991-1994. We use the coefficients from thisregression to inflate the value that would pertain had their been no depreciation (i.e., as if it had been built
between 1991-1994. After all the adjustments, the mean adjusted value is 32 percent bigger than the
unadjusted mean, due to the importance of age and vintage effects.
b.  Matching with construction cost data
The Means data reflect average costs for several home sizes and qualities, with and without a basement.
The data are reported for 177 cities. We match these cities to their corresponding metropolitan areas.  In 95
percent of the cases, there is a one-to-one correspondence of city and metropolitan area.  For the rest of
MSAs, we use the cost in the main city.  The variation in costs across cities within the same metropolitan
area (e.g., Long Beach and Los Angeles) is very small.  For units that are in unidentified MSAs or not in an
MSA, we assign construction costs at the regional level. Construction costs at the regional level are
obtained as a weighted average of construction costs for all MSAs in a region, where the weights are
population by MSA and year. We have data on construction costs for 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1979, 1980,
1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2000. We use interpolation to estimate the
values in the missing years from 1970 to 2000. From 1980 to 2000, the evolution of construction costs is
almost linear, so we use linear interpolation for that period.  Unfortunately, we only have data for 1970 and
1979 when considering the seventies.  Linear interpolation may be too rough, as inflation accelerated only
after 1974.  Consequently, the approach we take is to calculate the share of the CPI gap between 1970 and
1979 that was covered each year.  We then apply that share to the gap between the 1970 and 1979 housing
cost indexes.
Finally, we match homes with the corresponding construction costs for its MSA, year, and type of building
(i.e., by size and whether there is a basement present).  As noted in the text, all cost data are for an
economy-quality home based on Means Co.’s specifications.
± Expenditures in Renovation
We define expenditures on renovation as the sum of the following expenditure categories in the AHS:
  Roofing job
  Additions
  Kitchen remodeling/addition
  Bathroom remodeling/addition
  Siding replaced
  Other repairs/fixes over $500
  Major equipment replaced added
  Storm windows/doors added/replaced
  Insulation added/replaced
  Costs of routine maintenance
We restrict ourselves to the 1984-1994 time period.  Prior to 1984, the AHS does not provide information
on such expenditures.  Beginning in 1995, the definition of such expenditures changed and we cannot
match to previous data and obtain a consistent series.
Finally, we assign a zero expenditure in cases in which the household reports not having done any
addition/alteration. When the household reports to have done the repair but does not report the value, we
impute the average value for that kind of repair in that MSA and year.
Additional General Notes
  All dollar values are deflated to 2001 prices using the urban CPI “All items less shelter” index.
  MSA definitions follow the ones provided by the AHS, except in Table 1, where we use 1999
MSA/NECMA definitions.
  We use only single unit structures from the AHS.  However, these units may be attached or detached.